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EVERYONE, THE HUMAN ACTOR: 
RECOGNISING THE NON-INDEXICAL INDIVIDUAL 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that the individual, as an actor with an identity over and above his or her 
membership in social groupings and cultural traditions, exists universally as an ontological 
reality. The recognition of this figure in anthropology is both an empirical and a moral 
necessity. The article suggests the moniker, Everyone, for the transcendent individual figure. 
 The course of the article, after the introduction of Everyone, is to admit the critiques 
that have appeared in social commentary of such a figure, critiques of cultural, institutional, 
real-politische and phenomenological kinds. The article suggests ripostes to these critiques, 
ripostes which would invest Everyone with an ontological and a moral existence that is 
anthropologically persuasive and accord with the ethnographic record. Everyone is the 
individual within the role-player, the actor who has the capacity to ‘pass’ as member of any 
social grouping, any cultural tradition. 
 The article concludes with a discussion concerning the way ahead for anthropology 
were Everyone to become disciplinarily legitimated and be given free passage into social 
accounting. 
 
 
The question of Everyone 
In a celebrated definition, which formed the basis of his interpretive anthropology, Clifford 
Geertz (1970:57) wrote:  
 
 culture is best seen as (...) a set of control mechanisms --plans,  
 recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call 'programs')--  
 for the governing of behaviour. 
 
It is the ‘agency’ of these cultural mechanisms, he went on, which is responsible for reducing 
the breadth and indeterminateness of the individual human being's inherent capacity to live 
thousands of lives to the specificity and narrowness of his actual accomplishment in one life. 
While it may be the case that being human is being individual, Geertz elaborated, 
nevertheless we become fully individual human beings only ‘under the guidance of cultural 
patterns, historically created systems of meaning in terms of which we give form, order, point 
and direction to our lives’ (Geertz 1970:63).  
 The broader implications of this view of cultural agency vis-à-vis individual human 
identity is that to ascertain ‘the unity of Man’ --the quest with which ‘Classical 
Anthropology’ began our disciplinary endeavour-- is to recognise the range, nature, basis and 
implication of cultural variety and specificity. To be human is not to be Everyman but to be a 
particular kind of man. The anthropologist does not quest after uniformities, Geertz 
concluded, empirical commonalities in behaviour over time and place --an ‘underlying, 
unchanging normative type’-- whereby differences between individuals and groups might be 
rendered secondary or eccentric, for this is to presume a metaphysical entity, and to replace 
living details with ‘dead stereotype’ (Geertz 1970:63). The interpretive anthropologist seeks 
and finds human unity in cultural diversity... 
 Geertz admitted that he was ‘more than happy to acknowledge Wittgenstein as [his] 
master’ (2000:xi). Interpretive anthropology was an operationalising of tenets from 
Wittgenstein’s later work concerning ‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’. In particular, a 
reading of the relativity and the determining power of forms of life can be found in Geertz’s 
premise, above, that ‘the human’ manifests itself only in lives lived under the dispensation of 
particular sets of public symbolic practices and conceptual presuppositions. The interpretive-
anthropological quest is not, after Kant, for an accumulating aggregate of knowledge on the 
singularly human but an extending series of indexical or contextual appreciations: ‘human 
being’ is to be known as various positionings in a multitude of symbolic systems with regard 
to an assortment of specific local ends (Geertz 2000:xiii). 
 My intention is this article is to oppose this Geertzian vision with a more ‘classical’ or 
‘Kantian’ or ‘Enlightenment’ one. I shall call the vision ‘cosmopolitan’. I wish to reinsert into 
anthropology the figure of Everyman --‘Everyone’, better-- and to explore the possibilities of 
again supposing that ‘the unity of Man’ (or ‘Humankind’) might translate into a knowable 
singularity. ‘Everyone’ is the term I would give to that human-individual actor whose 
intrinsic nature may be described separately from a description of the details of his or her 
current cultural milieu, social standing, structural emplacement or symbolic categorisation.  
 Everyone’s nature, I contend, may be described anthropologically, and also legally or 
morally. The human-individual actor devoid of sociocultural attachments is a basis, a 
beginning, not only for a social-scientific appreciation of the human condition but also an 
ethical securing of the rights to a human life. Everyone is the seat of certain capacities which 
transcend particular current manifestations of common, normative public practices. 
Abstracting Everyone from the currency of context is to construe a figure which is viable 
social-scientifically and ethically.  
 Indeed, I claim that the Everyone is the necessary figure. It is his or her capacities 
which are responsible for both social systems and cultural worlds --making them into 
ongoing environments of human interaction-- and it is an error to tie these capacities only to 
current manifestations. The reducing which Geertz spoke about --the way cultural worlds 
reduced the breadth and indeterminateness of the individual human being's inherent capacity 
to live thousands of lives to the specificity and narrowness of his actual accomplishment in 
one life-- is not a once-and-for-all occurrence, it need not be a single occurrence (individuals 
possess multiple, simultaneous and hybrid cultural belongings), and it does not go to the core 
of individual consciousness (individuals can adopt ironic stances to normative cultural 
attachments to which they are at the same time ‘absolutely’ loyal). 
 Everyone is a Kantian figure inasmuch as it was he who not only formulated 
anthropology as a modern disciplinary pursuit --an elucidation at once scientific and ethical 
of humankind as a singularly knowable phenomenon whose lot might be improved-- but also 
saw this as part of a ‘cosmopolitan’ project by which the diversity of particular, lived 
individual lives (‘polis’) were to be known and adjudged in the light of global conditions and 
possibilities (‘cosmos’). It was Kant whose ‘categorical imperative’ entailed the necessity of 
positing a global individual actor whose consciousness, whose capacities for interpretation 
and judgement, were not circumscribed by current local conditions, were not tied to any 
sociocultural indexing or context. Here was a global individual actor in possession of 
transcendent qualities whose humanity was grounded in a universal form of embodiment. 
Anthropology should endeavour to know that body, and work towards ensuring the best 
conditions for its nurturance and fulfilment --so that it might make the best life for itself. 
 Is Everyone and his or her ‘cosmopolitan body’ a recognisable figure in real life? 
Does anyone actually live this transcendent, ironic existence? Even if they did so, would it be 
knowable by others --who are likely to approach that individual body by way of particular, 
local classifications? Then again, does the figure have to be actually lived for it to be social-
scientifically and ethically viable? In this article I want to consider the possibility of ‘strong’ 
affirmations to these queries. Yes, Everyone is a lived and a recognisable phenomenon. But 
then Everyone is also a viable figure --legitimate, necessary-- irrespective of whether or not it 
should be habitually recognised and lived. Before advancing my arguments further, however, 
let me outline other established critiques of the Kantian position --Geertz’s Wittgensteinian or 
Herderian one being by no means alone.  
 
 
Critique of Everyone 
Geertz’s cultural critique of a transcendent individual can be linked with  
critique of institutional, realpolitische and phenomenological kinds. 
 
i) The critique from realpolitik 
In an article entitled, 'Against the new liberalism: Rawls, Dworkin and the emptying of 
political life', John Gray (1992) argued that the celebrated text in recent liberal philosophy, 
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971), proved that such theorising could not treat the 
political dilemmas of the age: a political life dominated by communitarian identity politics; 
by renascent particularisms, militant religions and resurgent ethnicities. A Theory of Justice 
did little more than articulate the prejudices of an Anglo-American academic class which 
lacked any possible insight into an age characterised by the collapse of the Enlightenment 
vision that humanity might one day shed traditional allegiances and local identities in favour 
of a universal civilisation grounded in rational morality and realisations of a generic 
humanity. History has flouted the Enlightenment project, and on a world-historical scale.  
 Gray explains: For Rawls, as with the liberal theorists who preceded him (Kant, John 
Stuart Mill) and those who followed (Brian Barry, Alan Ryan), political philosophy is the 
propounding of a morality which is agent-neutral. That is, it bases itself on the assumption 
that one can and should treat the individual human subject who is voided of all particularistic 
loyalties and conceptions of good, a voided human subject who might take forward and be 
himself or herself ‘subject to’ universal principles of justice or rights. A moral point of view 
is an agent-neutral point of view inasmuch as it is impartial and impersonal. A liberal state --
national or global-- extends a neutral morality rationally and universally. 
 But here, Gray continues, is no recognition of, or engagement with, human beings as 
they are found in the world, amid their diverse histories and communities. Instead, here is an 
abstract concept of the person voided of any definitive cultural identity or historical 
inheritance. The neo-Kantian project to derive principles of justice and rights from the nature 
of the decontextualised person has no metaphysics, no anthropology. Elaborated at a distance 
from the political life of the real world it represents an absurdity. No principles of justice, 
rights or arbitration can be secured through treatments of metaphysically neutered selves. 
 Gray elaborates: the Kantian person is a cipher, without history or culture, denuded of 
the special attachments which in the real world provide human beings with their particular 
identities: the contingencies that become essential aspects of identities. The 'common good' 
that neo-Kantians espouse as a universal ethic, to be pursued subject to the constraints of an 
impartial justice, are neither of them realisable because in the real world people see 
themselves essentially not as individuals with contingent relationships and attachments but as 
social beings constituted by their histories and communities. They assert themselves, via 
social and cultural movements, as peoples not individuals. Their senses of justice and 
injustice arise from their membership of proud, oppressed, distinctive communities. It is this 
which has been instantiated in the great political forces of the age (nationalist, religious, 
ideological). Human beings individuate themselves, if at all, as members of historic 
communes not as specimens of generic humanity. 
 Adopting the bias of contemporary Anglo-American culture, deploying an abstract 
unhistorical individualism as a global norm, Gray concludes, ignores the realities of historical 
communities. In search of timeless verities neo-Kantianism delivers a world of individual 
strangers devoid of diverse and deep cultural belongings. However unpalatable, realpolitik 
reveals real communities of exclusivities, hierarchies and bigotries, casting shadows of 
enmity and settling their boundaries by war. 
 
ii) The critique from institutionalism 
In his book, The Social Production of Indifference, Michael Herzfeld (1993) sets out 
conceptually to unravel the 'West' and, in particular, its much-vaunted rationality, by offering 
a critique of the teleology which would have the state operate independently of its staff as a 
thing-in-itself: a bureaucracy independent of cultural values. 
  Indifference to the plight of individuals and groups (a rejection of their common 
humanity, a denial of their identity and selfhood), however inadvertent, often co-exists with 
democratic and egalitarian ideals, Herzfeld explains, and the coincidence is instructive. How 
is it that political entities, state structures, that celebrate the rights of the above (as the 
cultures and countries of the self-proclaimed civilised 'West' stereotypically do) often seem 
cruelly selective in applying them and may end up sanctioning everything from petty 
bureaucratic bloody-mindedness to genocide? The answer lies in the ‘willing operators’ who 
make decisions on the basis of 'the law'. The law as discourse --as a set of symbols, idioms 
and concepts-- can be put to use for the most totalitarian and the most democratic of 
applications, and to justify diversities and inconsistencies in bureaucratic behaviour. So 
ambiguous is political symbolism in practice, that it can carry directly opposed sets of 
meanings. Indeed, the constancy of rhetorical bureaucratic form, its 'rationality', is a mask, an 
armour, an enabling condition, a license, for the most capricious and momentary of 
interpretive applications (for power-grabbing, humiliation and indifference) and for highly 
labile and situational meanings.  
 The condition of modernity is marked by increased centralisation and scale. But the 
symbolic roots of Western bureaucracy are to be found in the first instance outwith 
bureaucracy, in the familiar and familial of popular culture, of classification and cosmology: 
the inchoate nature of the state and its apparatuses are glossed with the familiar signs of the 
body, self and family. Bureaucrats co-opt and then re-present these signs and so instil a 
primordial core within the nation-state: the symbolic values activated in the expression of the 
state remain remarkably consistent from lowest levels of social integration to (their reflection 
in) the highest. In other words, Western claims to bureaucratic rationality can more properly 
be seen as operationalised in terms of culturally constructed and specific logics: the so-called 
non-rational aspects of cultural life never really disappear. 
 The liberal-democratic bureaucracy is thus directly analogous to the ritual system of a 
religion: social practice is informed by a cosmological model. Bureaucrats and clients thus 
use alike a version of 'secular theodicy' (Weber) to explain immoral vagaries of bureaucratic 
process and to exonerate themselves of responsibility and blame in the face of ‘the system’s’ 
ineluctable, inexorable, fateful forces. Bureaucratic officiates, meanwhile, form an elect 
whose individual ‘sins’ do not undermine the perfection of the ideal order they share: they 
employ a version of a sacralised national order in their making of 'rational' decisions which 
enables them to subordinate personal identities and fates to an encompassing collective good. 
Finally, the bureaucracy reaffirms its overriding, moral identity in a routine of everyday, 
cyclical and calendrical 'rites'. 
 Or again, the rhetoric of the liberal-democratic state is redolent with kinship 
metaphors of 'blood' even as it defines itself in terms of immunity to family interest and a 
commitment to rational management. An ideal kinship is the principle vehicle by which a 
nation is imagined and managed: the logic of nationalism treats the nation as a family, 
bridging between body and polity, between blood and culture. Kinship and its extensions 
furnish a rhetoric of political pollution, while familial and bodily symbols operate as 
powerful emotive magnets, uniting societies as wholes. 
 Bureaucratic indifference in the Western nation-state, Herzfeld concludes, is socially 
produced through the selective deployment of a kin-based discrimination between selves and 
others. It is a selective rejection of those arbitrarily defined as different, as out of place, and 
hence outsiders to the community. It uses the relative, indexical, contingent labels and 
categories of everyday social life to make absolute cultural exclusions on the basis of 
purported natural and essential differences. It thus provides a moral alibi for inaction (indeed, 
for treating people 'like dirt') and makes itself tolerable to fellow-insiders by presenting itself 
in terms that are at once familiar and familial. The purported rationality of a universal 
citizenry actually manifests itself in highly indexical logics and behaviour. 
 
iii) The critique from phenomenology 
In his article, ‘Justice a Larger Loyalty', Richard Rorty (1998) revisits Kant’s foundational 
distinction between loyalty and justice. Are loyalty and justice substantively different, even 
when, for instance, we refrain from being loyal to a family member and hand him over to the 
police because he is a murderer? For Kant, Rorty explains, the two were radically distinct: 
justice sprang from reason while loyalty sprang from sentiment. By use of reason we may 
conceptualise and impose universal and unconditional moral obligations, while loyalty 
entailed community attachments and other affectional relations and introduced arbitrary 
distinctions between people. Justice and morality had an ideal purity to them, Kant 
concluded, which must be protected from contamination by the irrationalities and 
particularities of loyalty.  
 For Rorty, and others (Annette Baier, Charles Taylor, Alastair MacIntyre), 
phenomenological grounds make it difficult to claim differentiation between reason and 
sentiment. ‘Universal validity’ is a form of social experience and a matter of socio-historical 
consensus. One’s moral identity is determined by the group(s) with which one associates and 
is loyal. Moral dilemmas between 'loyalty' and 'justice' result from conflict between different 
group identities, different selves and ‘narrative densities’ of world-view. It is not that we have 
a true ‘Kantian’ self that can and should obey the call of reason against sentimental 
attachment and see 'humanity' before him. 
 Rorty elaborates: We need to recognise that 'moral' (after Marx and Durkheim) is a 
shorthand for a concrete web of social practices and customs. ‘Justice’ is a name for 
attachment to a group larger than our immediate attachments, the name we give to loyalty to 
a larger group over against a smaller one: the nation or humanity over against the family or 
community. When we hand over a family member to the police because he is a murderer, this 
is not the moral victory of reason against sentiment but the solving of conflict between 
different community attachments. We cannot resolve competing moral claims by calling 
some 'loyalty' and some 'justice' --the latter representing a universal moral obligation 
discovered through reason. There is no central, true self that responds to the call of reason by 
virtue of our being human. The self, as Daniel Dennett phrases it, is simply a centre of 
narrative gravity, elicited by way of social relations. 
 An accurate moral philosophy thus begins where people begin: not with a ‘thin’ or 
abstract notion of the human but with the ‘thick’ notion of  the everyday experience of local 
attachments. Only on special occasions do we thin our phenomenological awareness and 
experience ‘the universal’ or ‘the human’. Morality starts as a relationship of reciprocal trust 
among a close-knit group: to behave morally is to do what comes naturally in one’s dealing 
with one’s fellow members. Hence, one tells detailed and concrete stories of oneself as a 
local but only a sketchy story of oneself as a ‘global citizen’.  
 To reach global morality, in short, is to enlarge the group: one is a global citizen 
through loyalty to the species. Morality is never a matter of a reasoned approach to an 
abstraction like human dignity. 
 
 
In support of Everyone 
What can I say in the face of these critiques --cultural, institutional, realpolitische, 
phenomenological-- to support my contention that Everyone remains a viable and key figure 
of anthropological attention? My argument will take two forms, ontological and moral. The 
first claims that one does indeed meet the individual actor who is capacitated to move beyond 
classificatory identities of particular kinds --beyond classificatory identity per se-- and 
embody a nature that is human. The second claims that recognising this general figure is of 
great moral import, whatever the strength and ubiquity of particular loyalties and attachments 
--and, indeed, because of the strength and ubiquity of these. 
 
i) Everyone as existent: The ontological riposte 
The most prominent anthropological recognition and treatment of Everyone appears, perhaps, 
in Victor Turner’s (1982) work on communitas and liminality, in particular his extension of 
van Gennep’s conceptualisations to the so-called ‘liminoidal’. It can be recalled that van 
Gennep (1960) began by recognising the pervasiveness of rites of passage. Most ritual 
occasions could be described as concerning such transitions, and every individual life was 
characterised by them on a regular basis. Life in society, life lived in terms of everyday 
classifications of identity, of time and place, was regularly interleaved with experiences that 
concerned movement between and around such classifications. For Victor Turner, the 
liminoidal encompassed individuals and experiences that went beyond the classificatory as 
such. Communitas entailed people meeting, knowing one another and themselves, on the 
basis of a generic humanity. Communitas was non-structural, even anti-structural, in the 
sense that here were individual actors aspiring to and, for moments or occasions at least, 
succeeding in reaching a freedom from customary particularities. In the impulse that led to an 
individual decision to be a hippy, as monk, a kibbutznik, a punk, could be found a human 
creativity; and in the capacity to choose an anti-structural lifestyle, a ‘sacred poverty’, could 
be found a self-consciousness and a material praxis that went beyond the determinations of 
particular social constructions. 
 The movement between van Gennep and Turner, between the liminal and the 
liminoidal, is a significant one. For the former, what is being emphasised is the individual 
being moved --being changed, processed, re-shaped-- and being moved in a traditional 
fashion --made adult, healthy, clean, and so on. Similar emphases enter the literature in 
Garfinkel’s (1968) elucidation of ‘status-degradation ceremonies’, or Goffman’s (1961) 
account of the mortification of the self on entry to ‘total institutions’. For the liminoidal 
Turner reserved recognition of a movement that was individual, active, intentioned, liberating 
as such. Here was the individual actor freeing himself or herself from the ‘despotism of 
custom’ (in John Stuart Mill’s phrase) so as to embrace a human wholeness and potential. 
Even should the move appear as a mortification --of the flesh, of social status, of a storied 
past-- then Turner’s emphasis was on the voluntary and achieved nature of the change. The 
renunciation of ‘worldly recognition’ in favour of a ‘sacred poverty’ was an achievement not 
an ascription.  
Similar emphases to Turner’s then enter the literature in Kenelm Burridge’s account 
of ‘metanoia’ or a 'change of mind' (1979:215). Individuals might properly be described as 
'people of movement', Burridge suggests (1979:184), for the way in which they have the 
capacity to hold in abeyance conventional verities, refusing the security of fixity and stasis, 
and focus their energies and attention on the dialectic 'between what is and what might be' 
(1979:76). They transcend the truth of established moralities, perceiving, intuiting and 
deducing alternative truths, in the process changing body and mind. Burridge explicitly has in 
mind shamans, Nuer Leopard-Skin Chiefs, Melanesian sorcerers, Aborigine Men of High 
Degree, and Hindu Sanyasi. All embody, he concludes (1979:176), the wholeness of the 
human being as against the partiality of a particular cultural construction of moral 
personhood. To Burridge’s list might be added those who find themselves experiencing what 
James Fernandez has called a ‘deficit of meaning' in their lives, and a need for revitalization 
(1995:22). One puts oneself in a position from which one can look back at a stage of one’s 
life, a status, a placement, from which one has displaced oneself --possibly radically. One 
changes religion, changes marital partner, changes gender, changes nationality, becomes an 
exile, enters into a life of discipline. These acts of radical rewriting bear witness to a capacity 
to consider oneself beyond the routines and the constraints of a current existence. Here are 
human bodies and minds whose being is not limited by the particular character of present 
attachments and memberships. 
 A powerful manifestation of Everyone as a universally recognisable individual actor 
is also afforded by the phenomenon of ‘passing’: one of a range of practices that include 
fakery, lying, spying and fraud. In these varieties of dissembling can be found, I would 
contend, key insights into the human --into the presence of the fundamentally human amid the 
surface conventions and politenesses of social life and the normative forms of cultural 
difference. Silvia Posocco (2004:152) has defined ‘passing’ as individuals traversing social 
identifications purposely and strategically so as to adopt identities other than those conferred on 
them by enforced social categorizations. Passing can refer to any social taxonomy and 
dimension of difference, and is particularly common in regard to major markers of social status, 
power and privilege such as class, gender, race and ethnicity. 
 Some have treated passing narrowly, rather as with van Gennep’s appreciation of the 
liminal. Judith Butler (1993), for instance, emphasises the involuntariness of this manipulation, 
since the subversions often occur in such highly normativized and regulated sociocultural 
terrains. Sara Ahmed (1999), likewise, draws attention to the limits of the technique --some 
cannot pass, whatever their mimetic abilities-- and suggests it occurs by virtue of the existence 
of harsh ‘scopic regimes’ and social taxonomies. I would rather emulate Turner, as it were, 
and see in passing (as in the liminoidal) a key to the dynamics of social interaction and the 
architectonics of society as such (cf. Rapport 2001). Passing occurs by virtue of individual 
capacities and will to dissemble, and to ironise identities: to look askance at the distinction 
between how people see one and how one would choose to be. Normative, scopic regimes 
deliver not the conditions of possibility of the occurrence of passing but the conditions of need: 
the assumption that society conforms to a classificatory shape and that one’s categorial 
placement can be read on the body and is visible in behaviour. It is the classificatory and 
categorial conventions that the individual who passes sets out to parody or profit from. 
 Virginia Woolf (1969:223) captures succinctly the ambivalences surrounding passing 
when she writes: 
 
[O]ne begins letters ‘Dear Sir,’ ends them ‘yours faithfully’; one cannot despise these 
phrases laid like Roman roads across the tumult of our lives, since they compel us to 
walk in step like civilized people (...) though one may be humming any nonsense 
under one's breath at the same time. 
 
Individuals ‘walk in step’ to social conventions and cultural traditions but they do not 
necessarily do so blindly or unconsciously, though they may not always do so willingly. 
Moreover, this walking-in-step does not exhaust them, whether in terms of their energies or 
their identities. Beyond the conventional they lead tumultuous lives; they seem civilised but 
they hum nonsense. They pass themselves off as civilised, as polite, as conventional, but this 
does not (begin to) capture the essence and extent of their experience. 
 Passing would seem to me to cover a range of experiences and a range of degrees. In 
minor manifestations it would seem to be a daily occurrence. Every time one behaves more 
politely than one would really like, more harshly than one actually feels, more cerebrally than 
one’s emotions dictate, one passes oneself off as other than one is. I pass myself off as a lover 
of Israeli salads, say, not to upset my host at a dinner party. Or I pass myself off as a lover of 
Israeli food on an ongoing basis not to upset my neighbours. Or I pass myself off as Israeli 
not to estrange a person to whom I am attracted. Or I pass myself off as a veteran of the 
Israeli War of Independence to impress my credentials on future in-laws. Or I pass myself off 
as a particular Israeli officer from the War. Traversing this range is to move from ephemeral 
to long-lasting, from easy to achieve to difficult, from less consequential, less complex, less 
tactical, less fraudulent, less illegal perhaps, to more. But whether it is pretending to possess a 
certain palate or laying claim to a certain nationality, religiosity or past, it would seem to be 
the case that such actions are commonplace, are ubiquitous in social life, and offer 
fundamental insights into its very nature. Social life is role-playing. We can become attached 
to our roles but we need not. It can become difficult to separate our roles from our selves but 
it need not. The roles we play may take us a distance from the person whom we know or 
would like ourselves to be or no distance at all. What is to be insisted upon is what a focus on 
passing reveals: every social relationship, perhaps every moment of social interaction, is 
tinged with the playing of a role; one passes oneself off as in some way, major or minor, 
someone one is not. Furthermore, what is it to pass? It is to know who one is, to know what is 
conventional and what is expected of one (how one is or might be classed), to be able to 
measure the distance between the two, and, to an extent at least, for a time at least, to 
overcome that distance in acts of dissembling. Passing reveals the human as a constant 
presence within the role-player, putting on a front, a face, a set of vestments, such that the 
classificatory surfaces of social life are maintained –but not at the expense of a human 
capacity for self-awareness and purposiveness, a human consciousness. 
 Victor Turner states the case well for our anthropological informants when he writes: 
 
 [T]here were never any innocent, unconscious savages, living in a  
 time of unreflective and instinctive harmony. We human beings are all  
 and always sophisticated, conscious, capable of laughter at our own  
 institutions. [cited in Ashley 1990:xix] 
 
What I would turn to now, however, is the extent to which the anthropologist knows the truth 
about passing through his or her own professional practice, in particular as a fieldworker. 
 The foundation of anthropology as a science, Hastrup begins (1986:8-14), is that it 
lays claim to a criterion of authenticity that goes beyond what any one culture takes to be 
authentic and presents as authentic: anthropological science attempts to get beyond the local 
conventions of representation and exchange so as to render a human whole. Anthropology 
recognises that it is impossible to see from nowhere in particular, and yet, at the same time, it 
claims the possibility of seeing from anywhere. Anthropological science practises Terence’s 
famous dictum: ‘Nothing human is alien to me’. The anthropologist thus expects to insinuate 
himself or herself into any local situation and from there be able to make sense, to espy the 
human whole. Hastrup elaborates (1995:2-5): anthropological science breaks the dualism 
between us and them. The fieldworker and his or her informants meet in a kind of contact 
zone, a liminal space or tertian quid, between the classificatory cultural worlds of either side. 
It is out of an experience of this space that notions of the authentically human become visible 
and credible. One is situated, one’s perspective is individual, and yet one sees beyond 
particular cultures. One is specific in one’s biography, one’s relations, one’s attainments, and 
yet that contact zone between anthropologist and informant might contain any human beings 
anywhere. 
 To phrase it differently, anthropological method is to pass. The anthropological 
fieldworker learns to engage with local symbolic practices. He or she fits in. In my own case, 
this has involved learning how to be a farm labourer and builder’s mate in an English village, 
learning how to be a student of criminology and social worker in provincial Newfoundland, 
learning how to be a new immigrant in an Israeli development town, and learning how to be a 
hospital porter in a Scottish city. Some might have known me to have been (originally) ‘an 
anthropologist’ in these situations, but many did not. What became relevant to local situations 
of interaction was my ability to pass myself off as member of a local category –and to be 
granted the license to be a newcomer with whom locals were willing to attempt to make 
contact. At the same as I learned the roles of farm labourer, hospital porter, new immigrant, 
and so on –made mistakes, improved my performances, even adapted the roles somewhat to 
my own preferences—I retained knowledge of the distance between these roles and others I 
had played and, importantly, my own sense of myself. Moreover, while learning to engage in 
local symbolic practices, to play cultural roles, is a behavioural matter rather than anything 
more empathetic, as Geertz stressed (1973: ), is a matter, as Wittgenstein put it (1978), of 
sharing forms of life rather than opinions, still I would lay authentic claim to a knowledge of 
my informants beyond the roles that they, too, practised. Inasmuch as I knew myself as a 
role-player, I knew them too. My key informants were those with whom I made a kind of 
human contact beyond the normative expectations of the local forms of life we together 
maintained. Here was Sid the builder whose preferred imaginative space was gate-keeper to a 
masculine adult world of sex, drink, guns and fists, and beyond that an escape from the 
village as such. Here was Arthur the portering sub-manager who rather inhabited a world of 
Scottish nationalism: of Gallic language, Gallic music, Gallic politics and pure-bred (white) 
Gallic people. And here was Rachel the new immigrant who spent her time cognitively 
negotiating between her new Israeli home and the efficiency, privacy and modernity of her 
American roots. In each of these cases it was not that informants escaped the view of 
something in particular –a particular masculinity (Sid), a particular nationality (Arthur), a 
particular domicile (Rachel)—but that they transcended the views of particular role-players. 
And here was a liminal space where we all met. The contact zone between us was a human 
one: I meet my key informants in a space where we share the capacity to see beyond the 
classificatory status quo, where we are none of us limited by our behavioural presents. ‘The 
human’ is found not in a substantive form –a particular set of behaviours—so much as in a 
capacity, a potential, to be and to see beyond the cultural particularities of specific lives. The 
anthropologist leads a life of narrow, actual accomplishments, as Geertz stressed. But in his 
or her capacity as a fieldworker the anthropologist is able potentially to extend this 
narrowness to include any other set of cultural forms. He or she can adopt the view from 
anywhere. Enculturation is not something that lessens a capacity for reinvention or radically 
different role-playing. In the field, meanwhile, the anthropologist who attains the authenticity 
of a deep immersion meets key informants who are found to share the capacity to be more 
than the roles they currently play; the anthropologist become aware of their performing parts 
alongside him or her –parts that could be other. 
 As Hastrup has it, the anthropologist elicits a certain liminality from his or her 
informants; at the least, I have suggested, by way of his or her deep immersion the 
anthropologist recognises the potential for liminality in key informants. This liminality, this 
transience between indexical, classificatory identities, is revelatory of a human capacity, a 
human identity, I would argue. Neither the anthropologist nor key informants view from 
nowhere: all are situated amid their lives –their biographies, relationships, belongings—but 
this does not limit their capacities potentially to be anywhere else, to go anywhere else and 
become anyone else. The anthropologist embodies in his or her practice an abiding human 
capacity and identity to engage with any other human being and to adapt to any local system 
of indexical, classificatory relations. He or she passes as another, in minor and major ways, 
and finds the local doing likewise. In every indexical life there remains the potential for a 
purposive declassification. 
In a world of movement the anthropological practice of displacing the self from the 
security of a natal and native life-world is more evident as a common part of the individual 
life-course. John Berger describes movement around the globe as ‘the quintessential 
experience of our time’ (1984:55; cf. Minh-ha 1994:13-14). Emigration, labour migrancy, 
banishment, exile, tourism, urbanisation and counter-urbanisation, are the central motifs, 
‘typical symptoms of a modern condition at once local and universal’ (Nkosi 1994:5). One is 
careful not to equate migrancy and diaspora with an eschewing of essentialist classifications 
(cf. Amit 2002); one is aware that the uncertainties wrought by global movement can 
occasion a revitalisation of all manner of exclusionary cultural fundamentalisms (cf. Hall 
1996, Bauman 1998). Nevertheless, the liminality (‘liminoidality’, better) that has been 
identified above in professional anthropological practice is increasingly reported by 
ethnographers as an aspect of everyday behaviour –as an ethnomethodology-- in numerous 
situations of global transience and a growing set of so-called ‘non-places’ (Auge 1995). For 
many people and in many settings, identification and interaction pass off on the basis of non-
localised, non-indexical, non-classificatory logics. The ‘human actor’, it can be argued, is met 
on a more routine basis. Everyone expresses himself or herself more openly in social spaces, 
beyond the narrow confines of particular cultural milieux. 
 
ii) Everyone as necessary: The moral riposte 
According to Brian Barry (2001), it was the Reformation, and the need to reconcile 
Protestants and Roman Catholics, which occasioned the development of the ‘liberal formula’ 
which saw the depoliticisation of religion: a separation of church and state. More broadly, a 
public sphere was envisaged and instituted --the ‘statal’, or ‘societal’ or ‘social’-- which 
represented neutral ground. Religion and culture were privatised with no religious doctrines 
or authorities or institutions being afforded privileged positions: beliefs were to be treated as 
any other individual preference. The public sphere was neutral with regard to cultural 
difference and thereby just, fair to all: here, people of all religions and cultures would meet 
on equal terms. 
 ‘Liberal’ principles of justice developed such that the state claimed not to need to 
know the content of religious and cultural identities in order to deal fairly with its citizenry. 
In the eyes of the state, its rule of law and system of justice, individual citizens were public 
actors equal and alike. Their private preferences --religious or cultural-- did not interfere 
formally with their public rights, nor their public duties. The state --‘society’-- recognised 
citizens as individuals alike. As a moral precept, this came to be famously theorised by Kant 
as the ‘categorical imperative’. One acted morally when one could reason that an action one 
wished to carry out was universalisable: it could equally well be carried out by any 
individual, and did not reduce others to one’s own means. Individual actors had to be 
considered as ends in themselves. 
 Barry’s argument is that this treatment of citizens as equal public members, separated 
from their cultural preferences, regarded as equivalent units or exemplars of humanity, is an 
institutionalisation not in denial of the significant role that the religious and the cultural play 
in individuals’ lives but in recognition of it. It is because post-Enlightenment liberalism 
recognises how important cultural loyalties and world-views are --the common preference of 
people to live in cultural communities-- that it has sought to depoliticise it, relegate it to the 
private sphere, and deal with individual units of humanity undifferentiated according to 
religion, to gender, age, race or ethnicity, to culinary, sartorial, sexual or sporting taste. 
Liberal equality before the law was born out of a realpolitische response to difference, in 
particular to the historical pre-eminence of religion, and an endeavour to take account of it, 
institutionally in a just way. The paradox is that the non-indexical individual becomes a 
moral necessity because of the strength of cultural ties.  
 Given the pluralism and sectarianism, the syncretism and creolisation of religious and 
other cultural affiliations in contemporary societies, the moral argument made by a liberal 
Enlightenment in the face of religious disputation after the Reformation would seem more 
relevant not less. The figure of Everyone as an individual citizen who is due just treatment 
independent of, irrespective of, his religious choices and cultural ties would seem to embody 
an especial moral necessity. 
 A prominent comparative example to the Kantian categorical imperative would be 
Max Gluckman’s (1967) elucidation of ‘the reasonable man’ in Barotse jurisprudence. A 
central concept in the indigenous legal system, this figure serves as a practical standard by 
which members of the society might be accommodated and judged alike, the point being to 
posit a kind of moral-legal common denomination independent of individual particularities. 
Barotse law deals publicly with cases of individual dispute by considering certain human 
groundings: reasonableness was a mark of a common humanity. Gluckman concluded 
(1967:83) that consideration of such human proclivities and capacities would, in his opinion, 
represent ‘the central figure of all developed systems of law’. Barotse practice had its place in 
a global juridical canon. 
 Gluckman’s conclusion is a prescient one, given contemporary priorities to consider 
law on a global scale, and the cosmopolitan project to treat the diversity of particular 
individual lives under the aegis of global discourses and dispensations: to recognise Everyone 
amid the specificities of particular cultural classifications. Human reasonableness is not 
necessarily a narrowly Western construction or value. 
 It is Nietzsche, however, who has taken the Kantian notion of morality beyond and 
outwith the narrowly cultural to its furthest point. We post-Enlightenment ‘moderns’ have 
become ‘wandering encyclopaedias', he proposed (1873). Each individual compares and 
assimilates a world of customs, histories and philosophies, religions and sciences. Ideally, 
these appropriations live in individual bodies and minds not as dead weight from the past but 
as resources in present life-projects to effect personal future trajectories. In such a time of 
global comparison it is as if individuals had no single culture of their own, Nietzsche 
suggested; or, it is as if individuals were every culture at once, none being wholly foreign. 
 For Nietzsche there was great beauty to be found in the figure of Everyone as a 
wandering encyclopedia. In public terms he saw it as a portent of general identifications 
beyond the exclusivities and barbarisms of the communitarian and nationalist. Individuals as 
wandering encyclopedias were members of an amalgamated humanity: they embodied the 
aspiration that one might be a ‘good European’ not merely a ‘good German’ or ‘good Briton’ 
-- and thence that one might be a ‘good human’ (1986:no.475). In private terms, the 
individual writing and rewriting himself and herself on an ongoing basis, by way of a 
personal comparison and appropriation and invention of cultural tradition, was the highest 
example of individuals fulfilling the unique potential of each embodied lifetime. Nietzsche 
referred to this as the 'law of self-overcoming' (1973). It was a route to personal moral 
greatness.  
 As he elaborated, albeit that there was a shifting and contingent nature to an 
individual's knowing --it was always the view from somewhere, always in terms of one set of 
culturo-symbolic forms, and always under the aegis of a fallible, impressionable and mortal 
embodiment-- still an awareness of this served as a kind of overcoming, of moral betterment. 
To become self-conscious of the shifting complex of one’s embodied experiences in their 
becoming and to take an ironical stance with regard to cultures’ vocabularies of classes and 
values was, Nietzsche contended, to gain an overview and a sense of process --and personal 
progress. In this way the individual could hope not only to see and know but also to control: 
to overcome the body, its sickness and needs, to see through the illusions of symbolic 
categories, of forms and names imposed on life (at least to see them as illusions), and hence 
to re-evaluate, to 'transvalue', one's existence. 
 For individuals to overcome, transvalue and control their lives in this way Nietzsche 
set as a possible moral goal. It was an art --‘the art of life’-- and it was always going to be 
something difficult to achieve, but its reward was an appreciation of the rich fullness possible 
in human life. Working towards an overcoming of the situated self, gaining an ironic 
awareness of culture, time, diet, body, desire and lifestyle, afforded individuals not only with 
access to their full, embodied selves (to an integrity which cultural values and social 
structures thwarted), but also access to a fullness of life which they were now in the best 
possible position (healthy and hungry) to join with. 
The paradox, then, is that the non-indexical individual is a moral necessity because of 
the human capacity to reinvent new cultural and other identities and world-views --to 
compare and creolise and appropriate these on an ongoing basis-- and because of the moral 
worth (and strength and beauty) involved in so doing. Treating cultural difference ironically, 
and as part of a potential rewriting of self, seeing difference (any difference) as an aspect of 
the dramatic narrative of an individual or communal life and its processes of self-overcoming, 
is an act of moral accommodation. The alien is a potential (future or past) part of the self 
(nothing human is irredeemably alien).  
The ultimate conclusion of a liberal moral ethos which began with depoliticising and 
privatising the religious so that a diversity of individual beliefs and practices could be 
recognised (and regulated) by the state alike ends with the individual surpassing the 
classificatory divide of statehood also. Nationality, in a cosmopolitical vision, gives way to 
global governance and global citizens. The individual’s national identifications become, as it 
were, a matter of private behaviours also. In the public sphere there is a recognition, legal and 
moral, of the individual as having rights and duties that go beyond national affiliation. The 
cosmopolitical vision includes ideas of justice and right beyond nation-states and beyond the 
self-asserted sovereignties of cultural communities. In the words of Paul Feyerabend: 'There 
is no such thing as a "culturally authentic" suppression, or a "culturally authentic" murder. 
There is only suppression and murder, and both should be treated as such, with determination 
if necessary'. The individual who rewrites himself or herself, and, in an Age of Comparison 
(Nietzsche), picks and chooses, adapts and creates, with a global palette, is legally supported 
so to do at the expense of supposed national and cultural sovereignties and exclusions. The 
moral status of the non-indexical individual exists beyond such memberships, guaranteed by 
way of a global ‘citizenship’. 
 Appropriately, it is in the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC that the following 
prescription from the Chief British Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, Hartley Shawcross, 
can be found: 
 
 [T]he individual must transcend the state. The state and the law are made for 
man; that through them he may achieve a higher purpose, a greater dignity. 
 
The moral necessity of the non-indexical individual is that it provides the foundation 
of Everyone as a transcendent figure. 
 
 
Discussion: ‘[Do not] freeze people in their social categories. In the end we are all human’ 
Against cultural, institutional, realpolitische and phenomenological critiques I have posited 
ontological and moral counter-claims. Everyone can be made to appear as a viable figure in 
its own right, I contend. There are grounds for asserting the moral existence of an individual 
actor who is more than his or her membership of a current (or any particular) cultural 
community and his or her placement within a symbolic classificatory system. He or she can 
find himself or herself distinct from particular institutional workings, from particular group 
loyalties and political identities. 
 Everyone also appears as an emancipatory figure. It returns capacities and 
potentialities to individual actors that, in the Geertzian picture at least, are spent in the 
process of socialization and cultural placement. In Everyone,  
the capacity to lead an individual life, to narrow one’s focus, one’s loyalties, one’s relations, 
one’s world-view, to a particular cultural or communitarian set, is not necessarily a once-for-
all or even an exclusive attainment or effect. Everyone possesses an ongoing and a multiple 
capacity to lead particular lives, to pass into (and out of) social relations. The capacity is an 
individual possession and it includes the potential for irony: for critical reflection on one’s 
attainments of the moment, for amending or replacing these attainments, without necessarily 
exhausting one’s appetite for them, one’s desire or conviction. In short, it is Everyone who 
possesses the ongoing capacity to belong to, make and remake cultures. It is an embodied 
capacity which he or she carries with him or her in movement across and between 
sociocultural spaces, between places and non-places. For Everyone, there can be multiple and 
hybrid cultural belongings at one time and over time --or no such belongings. 
 After Isaiah Berlin (1958), a liberal formula recognises Everyone as exercising 
freedoms of two fundamental kinds. He or she has ‘negative freedom’, freedom to: to be and 
to do in an abstract fashion, unconnected to present possibilities or sociocultural 
arrangements, on the basis of a non-indexical human nature of non-specific behavioural traits 
and habits. At the same time, Everyone has ‘positive freedom’, freedom from: from 
oppression, exploitation, stereotypification; from communitarian ascription, scapegoating and 
imprisonment; from being treated as a means to another’s end. In other words, the liberal 
emancipation of Everyone is on two fronts. The first recognises him or her as an individual 
actor with the capacity to pass himself or herself off in an indefinite number of ways. The 
second safeguards the particular role-playing in which Everyone does engage so that it 
remains a voluntary engagement and does not prejudice the capacity to play (to pass) again. 
A third front is opened by cosmopolitanism: by the will to realise the liberal formula on a 
global scale and recognise Everyone as a global citizen. 
 The relative statuses of ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’ --of the non-indexical vis-à-
vis the role-player, the human universal vis-à-vis the culturally specific-- and the global 
relationship between the two that anthropology might advocate, was the subject of Ernest 
Gellner’s later work (as in the epigraph to this Discussion (Gellner 1993a:4)). In particular, in 
the article, 'Anything goes: The carnival of cheap relativism which 
threatens to swamp the coming fin de millenaire', argues strongly for the non-indexical status 
of certain human knowledge and the necessity of working towards a non-indexical morality. 
This is the starting point of any adequate contemporary anthropology, according to Gellner, 
and to pretend otherwise --that cultural worlds are sovereign in their customary norms-- "is 
simply an irresponsible affectation" (1995:8): 
 
[C]ognitive relativism is nonsense, moral relativism is tragic. (…) Valid knowledge 
ignores and does not engender frontiers. One simply cannot understand our shared 
social condition unless one starts from the indisputable fact that genuine knowledge of 
nature is possible and has occurred, and has totally transformed the terms of reference 
in which human societies operate. [Gellner 1995:8] 
 
There are natural limits to the extent to which societies can construct their own cultural 
worlds; it is not true that any world is possible, and within the range of naturally possible 
worlds, not all are cognitively equal. And there are actual limits to the extent to which 
societies do construct their own cultural worlds, given the contemporary situation of 
creolisation and syncretism, of overlapping sociocultural units, in rapid change, frequently 
undergoing fission or fusion; separate cultures do not exist, and there is no consensus 
regarding what any particular culture is. The ‘culturalist’ position, such as that proposed by 
Geertz (and derived from Wittgenstein), and which has now passed into political correctness, 
is, Gellner concludes, a grotesque exaggeration. The scientific revolution proves that not all 
concepts are social in nature, that cultural communities do not have terminal authority vis-à-
vis the truth, and that communal ‘forms of life’ or 'lifeworlds' do not trump human rationality.  
 If science removes the validity of customary norms as underwriters of reality, 
however, then science also deprives us of a traditional ability to underwrite values in absolute 
(culturo-religious) terms. Nor does science offer an alternative moral basis: scientific 
knowledge of the world is continually changing and cannot be tied rigidly to moral 
prescriptions as legitimation. Hence, the scientific revolution delivers a ‘moral crisis’ which 
is also ‘the fruit of our liberation from want and tyranny’; our anthropological duty, as 
Gellner prescribes it (1995:8), is ‘to work out the social options of our affluent and 
disenchanted condition. We have no choice about this’. Anthropology must consider a 
morality beyond culture; alongside the existence of trans-cultural and amoral knowledge it 
might become a fact of cosmopolitan life (Gellner 1993b:54). 
 It is to be admitted that in other places (e.g. 1998:183-6) Gellner makes it clear that 
what he calls ‘Robinson Crusoe modelling’ --in which I imagine he would have included the 
conception of Everyone as an ontological figure-- is in his estimation a normative charter of 
one particular social tradition rather than a portrait of humanity as such. Individuals able to 
deploy their rationality to compare and contrast culturo-cognitive worlds and claims from a 
position of ironic detachment are an historical phenomenon --one, as Max Weber showed, 
with Protestant roots-- and not, as Kant would have it, an abidingly human practice. Only 
after the European Reformation and Enlightenment did people stop being docile members of 
communities, perceiving through conventional classificatory Gestalten, and breaking asunder 
their cultures' cognitive limits by recognising physical-cum-technological and economic 
forces beyond the cultural. 
 One response to Gellner --the pragmatist’s-- is to assert that the difference between 
Everyone as a historical and as an ontological phenomenon has become moot: in concrete 
terms it is irrelevant. The world is increasingly populated by Nietzschean ‘wandering 
encyclopaedias’, whether they owe their existence to a Western sociocultural shift or not. 
Richard Rorty (1986), for instance, adopts this position, arguing for what he dubs ‘post-
modernist bourgeois liberalism’ not on the basis of what necessarily is but of what best works 
--to accommodate difference and to enable people to lead lives of personal fulfilment and 
social justice. But to make this admission could also appear to be a dangerous dilution. 
Cultural fundamentalism of any number of stripes could argue with Rorty’s notions of what is 
‘best’ for the individual and society, and what ‘successful’ and what ‘fulfilling’. It is 
important, I say, to retain Everyone --the Crusoe figure with inherent, embodies capacities-- 
as an ontological truth.  
 Furthermore, Gellner does not say that individuals before the Reformation definitely 
did not possess capacities for irony and unconventionality as potentialities, only that that 
there were not occasions for exercising these. The argument is a difficult one to prove one 
way or the other, and historical evidence has been used to posit opposite conclusions: that 
Everyone’s ironic consciousness is an offshoot of technological innovation (Ortega y Gasset 
1956) or literary (Oppenheimer 1989) or of global deterritorialisation (Appadurai 1991); 
alternatively that so-called docile members of closed communities --unconscious and 
innocent, in Turner’s appellation-- have always been a fiction (Phillips 1993), that individuals 
have always been involved in the ‘creative exploration of culture' (Goody 1977:20), and in 
'alter-cultural action' (Handler and Segal 1990). 
 A final paradox ends this article. The figure of the non-indexical individual actor is an 
existent one and a necessary one, I have argued, an appropriate starting point in political and 
moral statecraft and in anthropological theory and description. But how is Everyone to be 
known, and how proven, by others who might be wont to approach him or her by way of 
particular, local classifications? Culture, as Geertz began, represents a powerful set of control 
mechanisms: recipes, rules, programmes, Gestalts. Anthony Cohen strikes the right note, I 
would say, when he writes:  
 
We must make deliberate efforts to acknowledge the subtleties, inflections and varieties 
of individual consciousness which are concealed by categorical masks [1994:180] 
 
Social and cultural processes, he goes on, always attempt to colonise and occupy individuals' 
consciousness: to insinuate themselves into individuals' cognitive processes so that they are 
pressed into the matrices of perception of religious, ethnic, local, occupational groupings and 
classes, and identify completely with their roles. But anthropology must not exaggerate 
individuals' vulnerability to these forces or underestimate individuals' resilience. Individuals 
routinely resist: there are heroic and mundane battles. Recognising Everyone is a matter of 
subtle ethnography and political emancipation: anthropology contributing to the 
‘decolonisation of the human subject’ (Cohen 1994:192).  
 Everyone is elusive: he or she evades the descriptive classes of cultural and 
institutional and realpolitische routines, often. And yet, he or she is in constant existence: 
‘My distinctness, my being me, is quite unmistakable to me, there can be nothing of which I 
am more certain’, as Hywel Lewis writes (1982:55). Every time I catch myself passing as a 
particular kind of role-player (who could be other; who could be anyone) and every time I 
meet others in my anthropological practice whom I find playing roles (and who could equally 
be other), I encounter Everyone, and I would grant him or her free passage.
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